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Abstract: This paper draws upon central concepts from the psychoanalytic tradition, and the 
work of several theorists working in that tradition—Copjec, Lacan, Laclau & Mouffe, Lefort, 
and Zizek—to explain the identity crisis confronting the institution of adult education and 
outline a potential course of action for adult educators. 
Introduction 
Every society up to now has attempted to give an answer to a few fundamental questions: Wh^-:# 
are we as a collectivity? What are we for one another? Where and in what are we? What dp - -
we want; what do we desire; what are we lacking? Society must define its "identity," its 
articulation, the world, its relations to the world and to the objects it contains, n^nefeds and its, ,V 
desires. Without the "answer" to these "questions," without these "definitions," 8$era<<e#n be no v ~ 
human world, no society, no culture—for everything would be an un^feentitafed5chdbs. The 
role of imaginary significations is to provide an answer to these ||iest||ns, an anjjver that, 
obviously, neither "reality," nor "rationality" can provide. A 
5 s (Castoriaa^||987, pp. 146-147) 
# "li^  
Its roots firmly entrenched in the Western empirical-anal^c tradition, the institution of 
adult education, from its very inception, has looked to the ^real" and the "rational" to 
"define its 'identity,' its articulation,|^#%orld, its relations*to the world and to the objects it 
contains, its needs and its desires."||t)nly of late has it become apparent that "obviously, 
neither 'reality,' nor 'rationality' c^iprovide^' such answers. In spheres long the privileged 
domain of the orthodoj^fcadult ed&ca&Qi#fournals and conferences—the institution's 
"answers" have beeaf|yLbj<|fted to increasing scrutiny by an increasingly vocal lobby of 
educators committed to\"alfernative knowledge forms" (Welton, 1991, p. 26). 
Inspired by-trie success1|||pfrlMinist initiatives in other arenas, the alternative lobby has 
struggled xmr|!mittinglyj^ltrip the establishment's "answers" of their essentialist guise and 
reveal the sxdusionary interests at play behind their universalist gloss. But having 
- 4 shattered the ideat image that has long unified the field, the alternative lobby, no longer 
united by a common cause, is dissipating into a plethora of special interest groups engaged 
in various forms of identity politics. As a result, the institution of adult education, stripped 
"of its defining characteristics, is undergoing an identity crisis, a crisis that some fear 
threatens the very being of the field. How is this strange turn of events to be understood? 
What sort of response does this situation demand of adult educators? This paper draws 
upon central concepts from the psychoanalytic tradition, and the work of several theorists 
working in that tradition—Copjec, Lacan, Laclau & Mouffe, Lefort, and Zizek—to explore 
this perplexing problem and outline a potential course of action for adult educators. 
The Nature of Identity 
What is it that makes a "Canadian" distinctly different from an "American"? While 
members of both collectivities will protest and defend their "differences," just how they are 
different is often a mystery to Canadians and Americans alike. The same is true for 
members of other nations. In fact, the concepts "nation, nationality, nationalism—all have 
proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyse" (Anderson, 1991, p. 3). Such 
concepts, Anderson contends, are, in fact, "cultural artefacts of a particular kind"; 
1 See Briton and Plumb (1993) for one account of the factors that contributed to the establishment of an adult 
education orthodoxy. 
consequently, "to understand them properly we need to consider carefully how they have 
come into historical being," and "in what ways their meanings have changed over time" 
(p. 4). Descriptors such as "nation" and "adult education," then, refer not to a set of objective 
or real features but imaginary relations. Why? Because adult educators, not unlike "the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" 
(Anderson, 1991, p. 6). 
However, just as the members of most nations consider themselves part of real, rather 
than imaginary communities, so too do adult educators. This manifests itself in terms of a 
desire for a concrete "identity," for a constitutive "Law," for a clearly defined object of study 
and a distinct body of knowledge, evidenced in statements such as: "there is an urgent need 
for the development of a body of research and a theory unique to adult education" „*& 
(Darkenwald & Merriam, 1982, p. 25). It is this perceived desire or 'lack" that the instigation 
of adult education coalesces around, taking the form a collective subject whose very being 
depends upon the knowledge of its own origins being hidden from itself. As;*wi|h the ; 
individual subject of psychoanalysis, this collective subject exists neither prldr to aor apart 
from its desire and is comprised of two dimensions that correspop|g|p the c&k&cims and 
unconscious aspects of the individual. Consequently, it will be usf|uF||^say a litj^ e about 
how the psychoanalytic tradition arrived at and explains .its the rf^^^f the decentred 
subject. p 
The Subject of Psychoanalysis * \ 
Jacques Lacan, the enfant terrible of psychoanalysis, tracer the emergence of the modern 
subject—the self-conscious monad a|^l%ery centre of the" human being, the autonomous 
agent at the heart of the Western ^^manist tradition that serves as the unshakable 
foundation for Truth—to 17th Cenf|ry Europe, identifying its first appearance in the work 
of Rene Descartes. It wasDescartes^^r^^nized in his own process of thinking an 
awareness of himself^ Jus $£lf-conscidu!litss. This is act involves, "over and above the 
registration and percep&Q&joi sensations, an apperception: an act of attributing perception to 
an underlv^glperceivef* {Gto&z, 1990, p. 35, emphasis added). Hence Descartes' dictum: 
Cogito *erga sum; I think> therefore, I am. It was this revelation that led Descartes to declare 
consciousr|^''z&i4. subjectivity coterminous. It is exactly this notion of the unitary, centred 
subject tha^|ej£i#s discovery of the unconscious challenges. It is Lacan, however, who 
fephrases thi^juestion first asked by Freud in a way that is more in keeping with theories of 
lasjguage that postdate Freud's own work "Is the place that I occupy as the subject of a 
" signifier [in Lacanese, "the enunciated subject"] concentric or eccentric, in relation to the 
•place I occupy as subject of the signified ["the subject of enunciation"]?" (Lacan, 1977, p. 165). 
The meaning Lacan attributes to these terms will be discussed below. 
Lacan's answer, of course, is eccentric or "decentred," since he posits a subject comprised 
of more than one centre. His claim is that the subject occupies different places or locations: 
one the centre of conscious discourse—of "signifiers"—the other of unconscious discourse 
governed by "signifying mechanisms" that shape the "signified" and can, therefore, be 
designated legitimately as thought. It is Lacan's contention that this bipolarity demands a 
reformulation of Descartes' Cogito: "I think [on an unconscious level, at the level of the 
"signified"] where I am not [that is, on a conscious level, at the level of the "signifier"], 
therefore I am where I do not think" (Lacan, 1977, p. 166). What Descartes fails to recognize, 
according to Lacan, is that the concept, "subject," is comprised of two elements, elements 
that correspond to Ferdinand de Saussure's (1983) "signifier" and "signified—to the word 
used to represent or signify a thought, "apple," for instance, and the thought object 
itself. The "subject of the signifier" is the subject of consciousness—that which is 
enunciated—the "subject of the signified" is the subject of the unconscious—that which 
structures enunciation. This bifurcation, Lacan contends, is the condition for the possibility 
of the subject coming into being, for its ability to "unknowingly" represent its own desire to 
itself. As Slavoj Zizek (1991, p. 68) notes: "the Lacanian notion of the imaginary [enunciated] 
self... exists only on the basis of the misrecognition of its own conditions; it is the effect of 
this misrecognition." It is not, however, the supposed inability of this self to reflect that 
Lacan focusses on, "on its being the plaything of inaccessible unconscious forces; his point is 
that the subject can pay for such reflection with the loss of his [or her] ontological 
consistency." 
Misunderstandings of Lacan's position are legend, and some suggest quite explicable.2 It 
is a failure to grasp his distinction between the two subject positions—between "the 
enunciated subject" and "the subject of enunciation"—mat is often the source of much 
confusion, however. It is useful to bear in mind, therefore, that if the unconscious is the 
locus of thought—the subject of enunciation—and the conscious subject, or imaginary; ego, 
is the locus of language—the enunciated subject—an irremediable gap between what is 
meant and what is said is apparent. The result, according to Lacan, is that "||#||gplications -
of meaning infinitely exceed the signs manipulated by the individual...; as f^as^gns are 
concerned, man is always mobilizing many more of them than he kaows" (MllnPin 
Felman, 1987, p. 77). \^ > , J 
The unconscious, the subject of enunciation, is a site.pf unmeet knowledge that 
escapes intentionality and meaning, appearing to the cj$||cious subject only in the form of 
verbal slips and dream images—it is a speaking knowleagi||hat is dented to the speaker's 
knowledge. The unconscious "is knowledge that can't toler^. sone's knowing that one 
knows," and "analysis appears on thty$|§ne to announce that there is knowledge that does 
not know itself, knowledge that is supported by the signifier as such" (in Felman, 1987, 
p. 77). The point that should not |§| missed here is that the very condition for the possibility 
of conscious knowledge the actitf repression of some other knowledge on an 
unconscious level.3,..|^^lf|ice is norilWisence of knowledge but the negative condition 
for the possibility or a^^jg^^iw knowledge: the gap between knowing and not knowing, 
consequentk$|can n e v e ^ e ^ ^ s d . As Felman (1987) notes: 
there*1||||bejlo such th|ll§'as absolute knowledge: absolute knowledge is knowledge that has 
exhausted its b^n articulation, but articulated knowledge is by definition what cannot exhaust 
its own I^Jp^wledge. For knowledge to be spoken, linguistically articulated, it would 
-. constitutivtSy have to be supported by the ignorance carried by language, the ignorance of the 
excess of signs that of necessity its language—its articulation—"mobilizes." (Felman, 1987, 
pp. 77-78) 
aThe Collective Subject 
If we now return to the collective subject that emerges with the institution of adult 
education, we see that it is in repressing its knowledge of its origins in one place that this 
2 Metz (1982, p. 223), for instance, suggests that Lacan's "Ecrits make no claim to didactic clarity, at least in the 
ordinary sense (because I think they possess another kind of clarity, profoundly didactic in its own way: blindingly 
so, to the point that the reader represses it and makes enormous efforts not to understand)." 
3 It is for this reason that Foucault's notion of the subject, a notion embraced by some members of the 
alternative lobby to undermine the orthodoxy, must be dismissed as flawed. According to Foucault—most clearly 
in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison—the subject is totally determined by the apparatuses of Power. 
That is, the only knowledge the subject has is that which the apparatus instills in her or him. This overlooks the fact 
that the subject can have knowledge only on condition that some other knowledge—the conditions for the 
possibility of its existence—remains hidden in the subject. The subject, then, can never be totally determined by, 
transparent to, the apparatuses of Power, as is confirmed by the ongoing resistance of subjects to the System, 
despite the best efforts of the mechanisms of Power to quell such efforts. See Copjec (1989) for a closer analysis of 
this issue. 
collective subject is able to represent to itself in another the object of its desire: an objective 
set of defining features. But what are these two levels that correspond to the individual 
subject's conscious and unconscious dimensions? The first, according to Claude Lefort, is 
the "Social": it corresponds to the conscious subject, the subject of the signifier, the 
enunciated subject, the imaginary ego. The second is the "Political": it corresponds to the 
unconscious subject, the subject of enunciation, the subject of the signified, the ego ideal. 
The institution of adult education entails, then, the coming into being of a split collective 
subject that must repress all knowledge of its origins in its Social dimension, in order that 
its other dimension—the Political—may appear there as the representation/ideal image of 
its own desire: an objective set of defining features—the Law. The Lacanian notion of Law 
at play here is enabling, rather than prohibitory, being "conceived as an agency of 
'disalienation' and liberation': it opens up our access to desire by enabling us to disengage*, 
ourselves from the rule of the Other's whim" (Zizek, 1994, p. 265). Under the Law, thev* 
emergence of "adult education" as a Law-governed practice allows adult educators to ^, 
distinguish themselves from the "Other," to identify with one another and^e^lthemselves ]%* 
as distinct from all other fields of educational endeavour. t; v. s\ ^ v " 
However, for those who comprise the institution's Social dime^||on—"Mali: s 
educators"—to be able to recognize themselves in its Political re^|esepation/idjal image— 
"adult education"—this ideal signifier must appear greater than l%^ppferent from those 
signifiers whose identity it must sustain—as a Law. Wj^ |>, adult educ||ors identify with this 
ideal image in many different ways—through signifiefs sufih as "esse'ntialism," 
"perennialism," "progressivism," "reconstructionism," "ex%|^ntialism," "liberal 
education," "humanistic education," ^§haviorism," "radiclfiism/' "philosophical analysis," 
etc. (Darkenwald & Merriam, 1982, Jif43)—the term/image "adult education" must serve to 
sustain the identity of this wide ra||;e of practices above and beyond all their variations. 
This raises the question of the exacl^ature <|# the "Essence," the "Meaning," the Signified of 
"adult education" that kit these var^^^^nifiers identify themselves with. 
The Quilting Point \ „ 
That tJps^Master SigrtifieW6s'which all the various signifiers refer can somehow be 
cashed-oiitinJfrms of a^sef of objective features—the one-and-only, True definition—is the 
largely unquestioned belief of the field. In fact, this "multitude of 'floating signifiers'... is 
structured ^^|E^nified field through the intervention of a certain 'nodal poinf (the 
Lacanian point de caption) which 'quilts' them, stops their sliding and fixes their meaning" 
(Z!aiek/j,1991, p. 87). It is the Political ideal image, the signifier "adult education" that serves 
as this "nodal point." It may be easier to grasp this process of "quilting" if we take the term 
"radical democracy" as a corollary of "adult education" and observe how this signifier, this 
ideal image, serves to "quilt," to sustain the identity of diverse fields of political endeavour, 
in the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantall Mouffe (1985). Slavoj Zizek (1991) offers the 
following account of this process at play: 
Let us take the Laclau/Mouffe project of radical democracy: here, we have an articulation of 
particular struggles (for peace, ecology, feminism, human rights, and so on), none of which 
pretends to the 'Truth," the last Signified, the "true Meaning" of all the others; but the title 
"radical democracy" itself indicates how the very possibility of their articulation implies the 
"nodal," determining role of a certain struggle which, precisely as a particular struggle, 
outlines the horizon of all the other struggles. This determining role belongs, of course, to 
democracy, to "democratic invention": according to Laclau and Mouffe, all other struggles 
(socialist, feminist...) could be conceived as the gradual radicalization, extension, application 
of the democratic project to new domains (of economic relations, of the relations between 
sexes...). The dialectical paradox lies in the fact that the particular struggle playing a 
hegemonic role, far from enforcing a violent suppression of the differences, opens the very space 
for the relative autonomy of the particular struggles: the feminist struggle, for example, is 
made possible only through reference to democratic-egalitarian political discourse. (Zizek, 
1991, pp. 88-89) 
In the case of adult education, "the dialectical paradox lies in the fact that the particular 
struggle playing a hegemonic role [that of the orthodoxy], far from enforcing a violent 
suppression of the differences, opens the very space for the relative autonomy of the 
particular [feminist, class, race, gender...] struggles." The irony in the current situation, then, 
is that the alternative lobby, in struggling to shatter the orthodoxy's image of adult 
education, threatens to destroy that which "opens the very space for the particular 
struggles" that constitute the alternative lobby. This strange turn of events has arisen in 
adult education, and arises in other institutions, when those who come to embody the 
institution's Political mandate, whether in a democratic or a totalitarian manner, declare 
this Law, as they are inevitably inclined to do, greater than, separate from, and independent 
of the Social. s ~ 
The Problem of the Political ^liSk 
Of course, divorcing the Political from the Social generates legitimation«^"o^||nis. In'the 
name of what, for instance, might the will of the Law be imposed—Jhe Gool|||f j^p many, 
individual freedom, Truth? If the Political, on the one hand, sim^fy'^^oses its^fiilL the 
Social will inevitably revolt, but if the Political, on the other, is re%K$fito the Social, it can 
no longer serve as the Law of the institution. The dilemma of the P6lit.|eal is one all 
institutions must contend with: the institution, in the'art, Of distinguMhing itself from 
Other fields of endeavour, comes into being only through its. Political self-representation. In 
whatever form the Political is represen|ed, the problem remains the same: the Law must be 
abiding, yet open to change; legisla|^t a?e necessarily of the Social, yet must determine the 
Law for All; movements within thJfSocial, whether of a social or political nature, represent 
particular interests within the Social) but m ^ t do so in the name of the Whole institution. 
The expectation is forjh^^litical td b^wpfftfn the Social and concerned with the particular 
on the one hand, yet.hith$Ut and concerned with the Universal, on the other (Howard, 
1977). The question rex^m8Jvhowever, of what courses of action are open to adult 
educatorvgiven the abk$e and the institution of adult education's current predicament. 
Choosing' $ Cdiirse of Action 
The issue of concern to adult educators here, is clearly one of power in the name of 
what is pow^rto be exercised, and on whom and by whom? Lefort maintains that while 
power must be represented, it is not something that one can, nor should try to, determine 
empirically: it is a derivative of I'imaginaire, the Imaginary, whose "function is to 
neutralize the conflictual origins of the social, to create the illusion of permanence and 
necessity" (Howard, 1977, p. 256). The function of the Imaginary, then, is to diffuse the 
potential arising from the division inherent in the institution, and it is in situations where 
Power is separated absolutely from the Social, usually through some form of transcendental 
legitimation, that institutions are most stable. 
The price of such stability, however, is the blind imposition of Law on the Social. But 
Lefort contends that if lived experience is ever reduced to, that is, explained and determined 
in terms of, either the Political or the Social, the institution is being governed ideologically. 
For Lefort, "ideology is articulated in the attempt to re-create the... [institution] without 
history. The neglect of origins, the denial of the division, and the pretence of rendering the 
social space self-transparent are its characteristics" (Howard, 1977, p. 256). For Lefort, then, 
any attempt to situate and occupy Power in either the Political or Social is ideological: to 
attempt to do so in the Political is to identify oneself as an expert/leader; to attempt to do so 
in the Social is to identify oneself as an activist/militant. If we consider the courses of action 
open to adult educators in this light, it should be possible to identify which are ideological 
attempts to situate and occupy Power in either the Political or Social. 
Leader, Militant, or Adult Educator? 
The first course of action open to adult educators is to identify with the orthodoxy, to 
assume the mandate of expert/leader. This would be to situate Power in the Political and 
divorce the Political from the Social by legitimating Power in terms of the "scientism" of 
the Western empirical-analytic tradition. While this would undoubtedly provide the 
institution with a greater measure of stability, it is an ideological course of action because it 
reduces lived experience to the Political and attempts to "bridge" the gap between the 
Political and the Social and in so doing diffuses the creative potential between the two 
poles. 
The second course of action open to adult educators is to identify with the alternative ^ 
lobby, to assume the mandate of the activist/militant. This would be to situate Power ip 
Social and reduce the Political to the Social, making it impossible to legitima^^he Law i«t" 
terms of something that appears greater than and different from the Social.|pus^ould -
further destabilize the institution by reducing lived experience to the Social^^^l^purse of 
action too, then, is ideological because it tries to "mask" the diffe^^betweei t thp Political 
and the Social and in so doing, it too diffuses the creative tensiorl^eiHated between these 
twin poles. W | 
According to Lefort, the only non-ideological coursjb djten to the a$mt educator is to 
pursue a theory of the institution that she or he knows cai§|only be philosophical. To think 
one can do more is self-deluding and dangerous. A theory tplrflgnores its own limits 
inevitably falls prey to ideology of o n ^ l l p e t y or the other/xhe task, according to Lefort, is 
to participate from "one's own plac^ one analyses, writes, talks. No more can be done.... To 
want to be the leader, or to think cfpjoneself as the militant, is to be open to contradiction in 
one's own attitudes an&jRQm the sSteLieaMw itself' (Howard, 1977, p. 260). The challenge 
lies in resisting the J ^ p t | p o n to difnKethe creative tension between the poles of the 
Political and Social b ^ ^ ^ p t i n g either to dispel or ignore the difference between the two 
poles, in gusiling a p h r t p ^ l y ^ 
Is Lefoitt's Vision, wrj^clearly more elaborate, really so very different from what 
pioneers in the fiejd of adult education such as Corbett, Kidd, and Lindeman envisaged for 
, adult educatc&s Wer fifty years ago? Their belief was that adult educators should be 
^Schooled nofcbnly in the sciences but also in cultural history, that they should be able to 
uri&ersltand the work experience of their students and navigate their way through different 
streams of knowledge. Specialization in any one domain of knowledge was frowned upon, 
while a liberal grasp of a wide range of subject areas and interpretive frameworks was 
encouraged. Envisaged not so much as a process of acquiring the tools of learning, as a way 
of learning the relation between knowledge and living, the aim of adult education was to 
serve individual and group adjustment by drawing upon the situations and experiences 
that mold adult life. It was to be a process, a philosophy, whereby adult educators, freed 
from traditional bonds, could learn to navigate between the twin perils of Scylla and 
Charybdis—the Political and the Social—and dismiss any urge to diffuse the creative 
potential between these two poles as misguided and ideological. 
4 As Howard (1977, p. 9) notes: for Lefort, "the task of philosophy (or theory) becomes an emminently moral 
one, social and engaged, which consists in uncovering the moments of praxis within a given social and historical 
structure." Consequently, this notion of philosophy must be distiguished from that of the Western empirical-
analytic tradition: theoria—the pursuit of timeless, placeless Truths. 
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